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Preface
The idea for this book began with an essay I wrote a few years ago 
called “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy. After I posted it online, I was stunned by the attention it re-
ceived across the Internet and in the media. I realized that there was 
a lot of interest in the debate between privacy and national security 
and that the same group of arguments came up again and again. I also 
realized that there were many misimpressions about the law.
 Increasingly, I’ve found it frustrating when I hear certain ar-
guments in favor of heightened security that have become quite prev-
alent. I believe they have skewed the balance between privacy and 
security too much to the security side. One of my goals in this book is 
to respond to some of these arguments.
 I have written this book for a general audience, avoiding legal 
jargon and wonky policy analysis. I’ve presented more detailed policy 
proposals in my law review articles, but for this book, I focus on the 
general arguments and principles rather than technical minutiae. Of 
course, the details are important, but even more important are the 
basic concepts and themes of the debate. I hope that this book will 
put to rest certain arguments so that the debate can move ahead in 
more fruitful ways.
 Although I have focused primarily on American law, the ar-
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guments and ideas in the debate are universal. Despite a few differ-
ences, the law in many countries operates similarly to American law, and 
it often uses the same techniques to regulate government information 
gathering. The arguments and policy recommendations I propose in 
this book are meant to be relevant not just in the United States but 
also in other nations whose lawmakers are struggling with these im-
portant issues.
 Some of the material for this book was adapted from a few of 
my law review articles. These articles are much more extensive than 
their adaptations in this book, and they are often very different in form 
and argument. I have not fully incorporated these articles here, so 
they remain independent works. I recommend that you check them 
out if you want a more technical treatment of some of the issues in 
this book: Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 Boston College Law 
Review (forthcoming); Data Mining and the Security-Liberty De-
bate, 74 University of Chicago Law Review 343 (2008); “I’ve Got 
Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 San 
Diego Law Review 745 (2007); The First Amendment as Criminal 
Procedure, 84 New York University Law Review 112 (2007); Fourth 
Amendment Codifi cation and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judi-
cial Deference, 74 Fordham Law Review 747 (2005); Melville’s Billy 
Budd and Security in Times of Crisis, 26 Cardozo Law Review 2443 
(2005); Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 George Wash-
ington Law Review 1264 (2004). My thinking has evolved since the 
publication of many of these articles, so this book represents my most 
current view of the issues. Moreover, writing this book forced me to 
think more broadly about the topic of privacy versus security, and 
there are many issues I address here that I haven’t addressed before.
 Many people helped me greatly with this project. My wife, 
Pamela, provided constant support and encouragement as well as su-
perb suggestions on the manuscript. Many others have made im-
mensely helpful comments on this book: Danielle Citron, Tommy 
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Crocker, Deven Desai, Chris Hoofnagle, Orin Kerr, Raymond Ku, 
Paul Ohm, Neil Richards, and Michael Sullivan. I would also like to 
thank my research assistant, Matthew Albanese, for his help. My edi-
tor, Michael O’Malley, was a joy to work with, and my copyeditor, 
Dan Heaton, carefully reviewed the manuscript. My agent, Susan 
Schulman, provided excellent guidance and encouragement through-




“We must be willing to give up some privacy if it makes 
us more secure.”
“If you’ve got nothing to hide, you shouldn’t worry about 
government surveillance.”
“We shouldn’t second-guess security offi cials.”
“In national emergencies, rights must be cut back, 
but they’ll be restored later on.”
W e hear these arguments all the time. We hear them in the conversations we have each day with our family, friends, and colleagues. We hear them in the media, which is buzz -
ing with stories about government information gathering, such as the 
Total Information Awareness program, the airline passenger screen-
ing program, and the surveillance of people’s phone calls conducted 
by the secretive National Security Agency. We hear them made by 
politicians and security offi cials. And we hear them made by judges 
deciding how to balance security measures with people’s constitu-
tional rights.
 These arguments are part of the debate between privacy and 
security. The consequences of the debate are enormous, for both pri-
vacy and security are essential interests, and the balance we strike 
between them affects the very foundations of our freedom and de-
mocracy. In contemporary times—especially after the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001—the balance has shifted toward the security 
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side of the scale. The government has been gathering more informa-
tion about people and engaging in more surveillance. Technology is 
giving the government unprecedented tools for watching people and 
amassing information about them—video surveillance, location 
tracking, data mining, wiretapping, bugging, thermal sensors, spy sat-
ellites, X-ray devices, and more. It’s nearly impossible to live today 
without generating thousands of records about what we watch, read, 
buy, and do—and the government has easy access to them.
 The privacy-security debate profoundly infl uences how these 
government activities are regulated. But there’s a major problem with 
the debate: Privacy often loses out to security when it shouldn’t. Secu-
rity interests are readily understood, for life and limb are at stake, 
while privacy rights remain more abstract and vague. Many people 
believe they must trade privacy in order to be more secure. And those 
on the security side of the debate are making powerful arguments to 
encourage people to accept this tradeoff.
 These arguments, however, are based on mistaken views about 
what it means to protect privacy and the costs and benefi ts of doing 
so. The debate between privacy and security has been framed incor-
rectly, with the tradeoff between these values understood as an all- 
or-nothing proposition. But protecting privacy need not be fatal to 
security measures; it merely demands oversight and regulation. We 
can’t progress in the debate between privacy and security because the 
debate itself is fl awed.
 The law suffers from related problems. It seeks to balance 
privacy and security, but systematic problems plague the way the bal-
ancing takes place. When evaluating security measures, judges are 
often too deferential to security offi cials. And the law gets caught up 
in cumbersome tests to determine whether government information 
gathering should be subjected to oversight and regulation, resulting 
in uneven and incoherent protection. The law sometimes stringently 
protects against minor privacy invasions yet utterly fails to protect 
Introduction
3
against major ones. For example, the Fourth Amendment will protect 
you when a police offi cer squeezes the outside of your duffel bag—
yet it won’t stop the government from obtaining all your Google 
search queries or your credit card records.
 The privacy-security debate and the law have a two-way rela-
tionship. Many arguments in the debate are based on false assump-
tions about how the law protects privacy. And the law has been shaped 
by many fl awed arguments in the debate, which have infl uenced leg-
islation and judicial opinions.
 I propose to demonstrate how privacy interests can be better 
understood and how security interests can be more meaningfully 
evaluated. I aim to refute the recurrent arguments that skew the 
privacy-security debate toward the security side. I endeavor to show 
how the law frequently fi xes on the wrong questions, such as whether 
privacy should be protected rather than how it should be protected. 
Privacy often can be protected without undue cost to security. In in-
stances when adequate compromises can’t be achieved, the tradeoff 
can be made in a manner that is fair to both sides. We can reach a 
better balance between privacy and security. We must. There is too 
much at stake to fail.
A Short History of Privacy and Security
The law and policy addressing privacy and security is quite extensive, 
involving the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, state constitutions, 
and state statutes. Quite a number of federal agencies are involved, such 
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 
and others. There are countless state and local police departments. In 
order to understand how privacy and security are balanced, I will fi rst 
explain briefl y how we got to where we are today.
Introduction
4
The Right to Privacy
 People have cared about privacy since antiquity. The Code of 
Hammurabi protected the home against intrusion, as did ancient 
Roman law.1 The early Hebrews had laws safeguarding against sur-
veillance. And in England, the oft-declared principle that the home is 
one’s “castle” dates to the late fi fteenth century.2 Eavesdropping was 
long protected against in the English common law, and in 1769, the 
legal scholar William Blackstone defi ned it as listening “under walls 
or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and 
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales.”3
 The right to privacy emerged in countries all around the 
world in many different dimensions. Protections arose against inva-
sions of privacy by nosy neighbors and gossipy newspapers, as well as 
against government searches and seizures. In England, for example, 
the idea that citizens should be free from certain kinds of intrusive 
government searches developed during the early 1500s.4
 In America, at the time of the Revolutionary War, a central 
privacy issue was freedom from government intrusion. The Founders 
detested the use of general warrants to conduct sweeping searches of 
people’s homes and to seize their papers and writings.5 As Patrick 
Henry declared: “They may, unless the general government be restrained 
by a bill of rights, or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and 
rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and 
wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.”6
 These sentiments were enshrined into the Bill of Rights. The 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents the govern-
ment from conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Gov-
ernment offi cials must obtain judicial approval before conducting a 
search through a warrant that is supported by probable cause. The 
Fifth Amendment affords individuals a privilege against being com-
pelled to incriminate themselves.
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The Rise of Police Systems and the FBI
 Security is also a universal value, tracing back to antiquity. 
People have long looked to their governments to keep them secure 
from bandits, looters, and foreign invaders. They have also wanted to 
ensure social order by protecting against robberies, rapes, murders, 
and other crimes. But for a long time, many countries lacked police 
forces. In medieval England, for example, posses hunted down crimi-
nals and summarily executed them. Later on, patrolling amateurs 
protected communities, but they rarely investigated crimes.7
 By the twentieth century, police forces had transformed into or-
ganized units of professionals.8 In the United States, policing developed 
locally at the city and state levels, not nationwide. The rise of the mafi a 
and organized crime required law enforcement to fi nd means to learn 
about what crimes these groups were planning. The government began 
to increase prosecution of certain consensual crimes, such as gambling, 
the use of alcohol during Prohibition, and the traffi cking of drugs. Unlike 
robberies or assaults, which are often reported to the police, these crimes 
occurred through transactions in an underground market. Undercover 
agents and surveillance became key tools for detecting these crimes.
 The FBI emerged in the early years of the twentieth century, 
the brainchild of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte. He twice asked 
Congress to authorize the creation of a detective force in the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ), but he was rebuffed both times.9 Congress wor-
ried about secret police prying into the privacy of citizens. As one con-
gressman declared, “In my reading of history I recall no instance where 
a government perished because of the absence of a secret-service force, 
but many there are that perished as a result of the spy system.”10
 But Bonaparte was not deterred. He formed a new subdivi-
sion of the DOJ called the Bureau of Investigation, and brought in 
people from other agencies to staff it. In 1908 President Theodore 
Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the subdivision. 
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J. Edgar Hoover soon took the helm of the Bureau, which was re-
named the FBI in 1935.11
 Throughout the rest of the century, the FBI grew dramati-
cally (see Table 1). During President Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure, the 
size of the FBI increased more than 1000 percent.12 It has continued 
to grow, tripling in size over the past sixty years.13 Despite its vast size, 
extensive and expanding responsibilities, and profound technological 
capabilities, the FBI still lacks the congressional authorizing statute 
that most other federal agencies have.
The Growth of Electronic Surveillance
 The FBI came into being as the debate over surveillance of 
communications entered a new era. Telephone wiretapping technol-
ogy appeared soon after the invention of the telephone in 1876, mak-
ing the privacy of phone communications a public concern. State 
legislatures responded by passing laws criminalizing wiretapping.
 In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to wiretapping. 
“There was no searching,” the Supreme Court reasoned. “There was 
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hear-
ing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offi ces of 
the defendants.”14 Justice Louis Brandeis penned a powerful dissent, 
arguing that new technologies required rethinking old-fashioned 
notions of the Fourth Amendment: “Subtler and more far-reaching 
Table 1 Growth of the FBI
Year Agents Support Staff
1933        353       422




means of invading privacy have become available to the government. 
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, 
by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain 
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.” He also men-
tioned that the Founders of the Constitution “conferred, as against 
the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive 
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that 
right, every unjustifi able intrusion by the government upon the pri-
vacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”15
 In 1934, six years after Olmstead, Congress passed a law to 
prohibit wiretapping.16 But the law was largely ineffective, since it 
was interpreted only to preclude the introduction of wiretapping evi-
dence in court.17 The government could wiretap freely so long as it 
did not seek to use the product as evidence at trial.
 During World War II and the ensuing Cold War, presidents 
gave the FBI new authorization to engage in wiretapping.18 J. Edgar 
Hoover, still at the helm of the FBI, ordered wiretapping of hundreds 
of people, including dissidents, Supreme Court justices, professors, 
celebrities, writers, and others. Among Hoover’s fi les were dossiers on 
John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, Charlie Chaplin, Marlon Brando, 
Muhammad Ali, Albert Einstein, and numerous presidents and mem-
bers of Congress.19 When Justice William Douglas complained for 
years that the Supreme Court was being bugged and tapped, he 
seemed paranoid—but he was right.20
Protecting National Security: New Agencies and More Surveillance
 During the 1940s and 1950s, enormous threats to national 
security loomed on the horizon. Concerns about the spread of com-
munism and the Cold War with the Soviet Union led to an increased 
need for the government to engage in spying and foreign intelligence 
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gathering. In 1942 President Roosevelt created the Offi ce of Strategic 
Services (OSS) to engage in these activities, but it was eliminated 
after World War II. Just a few years later, however, President Truman 
revived the OSS’s activities by creating the modern CIA with the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947.
 In 1952 Truman created the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to handle cryptology—the breaking of encryption codes so that any 
foreign communications collected could be analyzed. For a long 
time, the NSA operated with a low profi le, and the few in the know 
quipped that its acronym stood for “No Such Agency.”
 Domestically, fears grew that communism was a threat not 
just from abroad but also from within. In the 1950s the FBI began the 
Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) to gather informa-
tion about political groups viewed as national security threats. The 
FBI’s tactics included secretly attempting to persuade employers to 
fi re targeted individuals, anonymously informing spouses of affairs to 
break up marriages, and using the threat of Internal Revenue Service 
investigations to deter individuals from attending meetings and 
events.21 The primary target was the American Communist Party, but 
by the late 1950s and early 1960s, COINTELPRO had expanded its 
interests to include members of the civil rights movement and oppo-
nents of the Vietnam War.22 Included among these individuals was 
Martin Luther King, Jr., whom Hoover had under extensive surveil-
lance. FBI recordings revealed that King was having extramarital af-
fairs, and the FBI sent copies of the recordings to King and his wife, 
threatening that if King failed to commit suicide by a certain date, the 
recordings would be released publicly.23
The Criminal Procedure Revolution
 In the 1960s the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, radically transformed criminal procedure. Police sys-
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tems around the country had grown substantially, and the FBI and 
other federal law-enforcement agencies were increasingly active. 
There wasn’t much law regulating how the government could go 
about collecting information about people.
 To fi ll this void, the Supreme Court began boldly interpret-
ing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to regulate what law-enforce-
ment offi cials could search and seize as well as how they could ques-
tion suspects. In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be ex-
cluded from evidence in criminal trials.24 In 1967 the Supreme Court 
overruled Olmstead in United States v. Katz, declaring that wiretap-
ping was covered by the Fourth Amendment.25 The Court articulated 
a broad test for the scope of Fourth Amendment protection—it would 
apply whenever the government violated a person’s “reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.” In 1968, just a year after Katz, Congress enacted 
a law to better regulate electronic surveillance.26 The law provided 
strict controls on government wiretapping and bugging.
 Thus, through the efforts of the Supreme Court and Con-
gress, legal regulation of government information gathering expanded 
signifi cantly in the 1960s.
Regulating National Security Surveillance
 An open question, however, existed for matters of national 
security. Were they to be treated differently from regular criminal in-
vestigations? In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question 
but didn’t provide a defi nitive answer. It concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to government surveillance for national security, 
though the rules to regulate it might differ from those involving ordi-
nary crime.27
 J. Edgar Hoover died in 1972, while still head of the FBI. He 
had been its director for nearly fi fty years. Many presidents and mem-
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bers of Congress had feared Hoover and declined to take him on, but 
a few years after his death, Congress fi nally decided to take a closer 
look at the FBI, an inquiry spurred by the Watergate scandal and 
President Nixon’s abuses of surveillance. Watergate involved elec-
tronic surveillance—the Watergate Offi ce Building was burglarized 
in order to bug the phone of the Democratic Party chairman. Some 
of the charges in Nixon’s impending impeachment involved misuse 
of offi cials at the FBI, the Secret Service, and other agencies to con-
duct electronic surveillance for improper purposes.
 After Nixon resigned, on August 9, 1974, Congress realized 
that it needed to examine more thoroughly the way various govern-
ment agencies were engaging in surveillance. Congress formed a spe-
cial eleven-member committee in 1975 to investigate surveillance 
abuses over the previous forty years.28 Led by Senator Frank Church, 
the committee published fourteen volumes of reports and supporting 
documents. The Church Committee concluded that the government 
had engaged in numerous abuses of surveillance, often targeting peo-
ple solely because of their political beliefs. Specifi cally, the commit-
tee declared: “Too many people have been spied upon by too many 
Government agencies and [too] much information has [been] col-
lected. The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance 
of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those be-
liefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile 
foreign power.”29 As the committee noted, every president from Frank-
lin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon improperly used government surveil-
lance to obtain information about critics and political opponents.30
 In part as a response to shocking fi ndings of the Church 
Committee Report, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (FISA) in 1978.31 The purpose of FISA was to erect a “se-
cure framework by which the executive branch could conduct legiti-
mate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within 
the context of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual 
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rights.”32 Additionally, the attorney general established a set of guide-
lines for FBI investigations in 1976.33 Moreover, major reforms were 
instituted at the FBI to prevent the kinds of abuses that had occurred 
during Hoover’s reign as director. The FBI director was limited to a 
term of no longer than ten years.
Receding Fourth Amendment Protection 
and the Rise of the Information Age
 In the 1970s and 1980s the Supreme Court issued several 
decisions narrowing the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. For 
example, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy when the police obtained a list of the phone numbers 
a person dialed or gathered a person’s bank records or peered down 
on a person’s property from a helicopter or rummaged through a per-
son’s trash left out for collection.34
 During the 1990s the rise of computers, the burgeoning use of 
the Internet and email, and the increasing use of digital records began to 
pose severe challenges for the federal wiretap statute, which had not 
been created with these new technologies in mind. In anticipation of the 
increasing use of computers, Congress updated its electronic surveillance 
law in 1986 with a statute called the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA).35 This law aimed to provide protection of email, stored com-
puter fi les, and communications records. Unfortunately, the law has not 
been dramatically restructured since its passage. Changes have been 
made here and there, but the ECPA remains largely the same. A quarter 
of a century after its passage, it has gone far out of date.
The War on Terrorism
 Then came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We 
became aware of dangerous terrorist cells within our borders. In an 
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extremely short time following the September 11 attacks, Congress 
passed the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which made a series of updates to 
ECPA and FISA, generally giving the government greater power to 
engage in surveillance.36 To better facilitate information sharing among 
the various federal agencies, many agencies were merged into DHS.
 Throughout this time, the government engaged in many 
clandestine information-gathering programs. The NSA began wire-
tapping phone calls between U.S. citizens and people abroad. Vari-
ous federal agencies collected records from airlines and other busi-
nesses for use in data mining.
Privacy, Security, and the Law
Throughout the past century, as we moved into the Information Age, 
the government has expanded its arsenal of techniques to protect se-
curity. Law enforcement in the past mostly involved searches of 
homes, people, and papers. Now the government uses technology to 
gather records and data, to engage in audio and visual surveillance, 
and to track movement. Much law-enforcement activity with implica-
tions for privacy involves “information gathering.” I’ll use this term 
broadly to encompass the wide variety of ways the government can 
fi nd out what people are doing, thinking, or planning. In addition to 
gathering information, the government also stores it, uses it, analyzes 
it, combines it, and sometimes discloses it. All these activities can 
threaten privacy.
 As the history I have sketched illustrates, the law has re-
sponded in many ways to the clash between privacy and security. 
Today the government has tremendous power and technological 
 capabilities to enforce the law and promote security. The law estab-
lishes privacy protections to ensure that the government doesn’t abuse 
its power. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is the 
primary form of regulation of government information gathering. 
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Under our system of law, the Constitution provides the minimum 
level of privacy protection. A state can’t provide any less protection. 
Nor can a federal statute. Other amendments, such as the Fifth and 
(as I’ll argue later) the First, protect some dimensions of privacy.
 In addition to the Constitution, several federal laws regulate 
certain forms of government information gathering. ECPA regulates 
wiretapping, bugging, and searches of computers, among other things. 
FISA regulates foreign intelligence gathering on foreign agents on 
U.S. soil. Other statutes provide some regulation of government ac-
cess to our records, such as cable or health records.
 There are also state constitutional protections of privacy and 
state statutes. These can supply additional privacy protections, though 
they restrict only police departments within a particular state. They 
can’t limit FBI agents or any other federal law-enforcement offi cials 
even when they’re acting within the state. Federal agents are limited 
only by the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. In this book, my 
focus will be almost entirely on the U.S. Constitution and federal law.
 Does the law provide a good balance between privacy and 
security? I believe the answer is no. Lessons learned after previous 
surveillance abuses have been forgotten. Protections put into the law 
in response to these abuses have been removed. I’ll explain how the 
law regulating privacy and security works, point out its failings, and 
suggest how it can be improved.
A Roadmap
In this book I shall explore four general issues, and I have organized it 
accordingly, devoting the four parts to (1) values—how we should assess 
and balance the values of privacy and security; (2) times of crisis—how 
the law should address matters of national security; (3) constitutional 
rights—how the Constitution should protect privacy; and (4) new 
technologies—how the law should cope with changing technology.
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 Within each part are chapters exploring various subtopics. 
You can read chapters independently of one another.
Values
 Part I involves the values of privacy and security. How should 
we assess and understand these values? Can they be reconciled? How 
should we balance them when they confl ict? The chapters in this part 
are concerned with how we can better understand what privacy pro-
tection entails, how we can more thoughtfully evaluate the costs and 
benefi ts of security measures, and how we can balance privacy and 
security in a way that isn’t skewed too much toward security. Privacy 
is often misunderstood and undervalued when balanced against secu-
rity. It is possible to have potent security measures and to protect pri-
vacy too, since protecting privacy doesn’t entail scrapping security 
measures but demands only that they be subjected to oversight and 
regulation.
 In Chapter 2 I examine the “nothing-to-hide argument.” 
Those making this common argument contend that they have noth-
ing to hide from the government. I demonstrate why this argument is 
faulty.
 Chapter 3 tackles another argument, that in order to increase 
security, we must sacrifi ce privacy. I call this the “all-or-nothing fal-
lacy” because it falsely assumes that privacy and security are mutually 
exclusive.
 In Chapter 4 I explore the “deference argument”—that we 
should be careful about second-guessing the judgments of security 
offi cials because they have more expertise in dealing with national 
security than judges or legislators. Courts often defer to security offi -
cials, and I argue that this deference unduly skews the balance be-
tween privacy rights and security.
 In Chapter 5 I argue that privacy isn’t merely an individual 
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right. The balancing between security and privacy is often conducted 
improperly because the security interest is characterized as benefi cial 
for all society while the privacy interest is viewed as a particular indi-
vidual’s concern. I contend that privacy should be understood as a 
societal value.
Times of Crisis
 In Part II I examine the law during periods of crisis. When 
we’re facing a threat to national security, the government frequently 
curtails rights, circumvents laws, and demands greater discretion, 
more secrecy, and less oversight. The chapters in this part demon-
strate that these special powers and exceptions to the rule of law are 
often unnecessary and wrongheaded.
 In Chapter 6 I address the “pendulum argument”—that in 
times of crisis, we must sacrifi ce some liberties, which will be restored 
when the crisis is over. I contend that this argument has it exactly 
backward. In times of crisis, we should be at our staunchest in protect-
ing liberty.
 In Chapter 7 I critique the “national security argument”—
that government information gathering about U.S. citizens in the 
name of national security should be subjected to less regulation and 
oversight than the investigation of ordinary crime. I argue that the 
distinction between matters of national security and regular crime is 
fuzzy and incoherent.
 In Chapter 8 I discuss the importance of “crime-espionage 
distinction”—separating the rules regulating criminal investigation 
from the rules regulating espionage. After September 11, the distinc-
tion was signifi cantly dissolved. I argue that the distinction must be 
kept intact.
 In Chapter 9 I examine how law protecting privacy and other 
civil liberties is often violated in times of crisis. A prime example was 
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the NSA surveillance program, under which the NSA contravened the 
law by engaging in warrantless wiretapping of phone calls. If we can’t 
ensure that the law is followed, the rule of law becomes meaningless.
Constitutional Rights
 Part III focuses on constitutional rights. What do our consti-
tutional rights entail? How do they protect us? Frequently, people think 
that constitutional rights protect a lot more than they actually do. As I 
explain in this part, numerous government information-gathering ac-
tivities are completely unregulated. If the Constitution is to provide 
for meaningful regulation and oversight of government data gather-
ing in the Information Age, then the Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of the Constitution need a radical overhaul.
 In Chapter 10 I discuss the latest tools of government infor-
mation gathering, many of which aren’t restricted by the Fourth 
Amendment. The scope of Fourth Amendment regulation, which de-
pends on whether the government violates privacy, is unduly con-
strained because the U.S. Supreme Court understands privacy as a 
form of total secrecy. I call this view of privacy the “secrecy para-
digm,” and I demonstrate that it is antiquated and fl awed.
 In Chapter 11 I analyze the “third party doctrine,” which 
holds that whenever a person or business exposes information to an-
other entity, no reasonable expectation of privacy remains, and thus no 
Fourth Amendment protection applies. In the Information Age, how-
ever, an unprecedented amount of personal data is in the hands of third 
parties, effectively removing Fourth Amendment protection from it.
 In Chapter 12 I argue that Fourth Amendment law needs 
dramatic reform. In many cases, government activities are unregu-
lated because the Supreme Court doesn’t think “privacy” is involved. 
I propose that paradoxically, Fourth Amendment law would do a bet-
ter job of protecting privacy by no longer focusing on privacy.
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 In Chapter 13 I explain the “suspicionless-searches” argument, 
which contends that requiring law enforcements to establish suspicion 
before engaging in a search isn’t compatible with efforts to prevent 
terrorism. I show that abandoning the suspicion requirement—as em-
bodied in warrants and probable cause—provides law-enforcement 
offi cials with too much power and discretion and too little oversight.
 In Chapter 14 I examine whether the exclusionary rule—
which makes evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment unusable at trial—is an appropriate remedy, especially when a 
heinous crime or terrorist act is involved. I discuss how the Fourth 
Amendment can be enforced without the exclusionary rule.
 In Chapter 15 I argue that the First Amendment should pro-
tect you when the government seeks information about your speech, 
association, beliefs, or reading habits.
New Technologies
 Part IV is concerned with the challenges that new technolo-
gies pose for the law. How should the law cope in a world of rapidly 
changing technology? In this part I examine the ways statutory law 
regulates government information gathering and the diffi culty of 
keeping statutes up-to-date. The best way to protect privacy is never to 
lose sight of general principles. To avoid becoming outmoded when 
the technology evolves, laws should be built around general princi-
ples rather than specifi c technologies.
 In Chapter 16 I focus on the Patriot Act, a law many argue 
should be repealed. But what if the Patriot Act were to simply disap-
pear tomorrow? Contrary to the conventional wisdom, little would 
change.
 In Chapter 17 I critique the “leave-it-to-the-legislature 
 argument”—that legislatures are better than courts at making the 
rules when new technologies are involved. I argue that courts must 
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remain actively involved in order to ensure that the law keeps up with 
new technology.
 In Chapter 18 I examine government data mining—the use 
of databases of personal information to analyze for patterns to deter-
mine who is acting suspiciously. Currently, the Fourth Amendment 
does not do much to protect against data mining. I distinguish be-
tween when the government should be allowed to engage in data 
mining and when it shouldn’t.
 In Chapter 19 I argue that the law doesn’t adequately regulate 
public video surveillance. In the United Kingdom millions of surveil-
lance cameras watch everything people do. Such a system could read-
ily be implemented in America—and it currently is being imple-
mented in various cities. I explain how the law can provide better 
regulation.
 In Chapter 20 I critique the “Luddite argument”—that op-
position to new security technologies (such as biometric identifi ca-
tion) stems from an aversion to new technology. I argue that concerns 
about these technologies are often legitimate. While many of the tech-
nologies offer great upsides, they can have catastrophic consequences 
if they fail.
